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ABSTRACT 
 
This article uses coroners’ inquest findings, media such as newspapers, magazines, 
pamphlets and broadsides, and family correspondence (all drawn from Scotland and the 
north of England) as well as civil and criminal court records and medical and legal 
writings from both countries to explore perceptions of the link between state of mind 
and self-inflicted death. It asks how doctors, lawyers, families and ‘society’ at large 
conceptualized, responded to and coped with suicide, questioning the extent to which it 
became medicalized: i.e. consistently linked with mental pathology. The aim is to square 
the apparently clear-cut, but very different understandings of doctors and lawyers on 
the one hand and coroners’ inquests on the other with the more emotionally charged 
and morally complex ways those both close to and distant from attempted or successful 
suicides related to their situation.  
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Historians have little explored how past societies understood the deaths of the 
insane. Yet, as Smith shows in the introduction to his article, early-nineteenth-century 
English patients could as easily leave a lunatic asylum on a bier as on their feet. Even 
good recent literature on madness regards mortality as an end to observation and 
treatment, perhaps a failure of management or therapy in practitioner and asylums 
terms, or a conclusion of experience, treatment or incarceration in a patient-centred 
approach (Wright, 1997; Michael, 2003a: 91-2, 110; Berkenkotter, 2008; Coleborne, 
2010: 97-8, 134-6). Suicide is an exception to this picture for two reasons. First, it 
initiated a process by which survivors came to explain a death that was particularly, 
perhaps uniquely difficult to comprehend (Bailey, 1998). Second, because of the modern 
(and modernised) perspective that few would kill themselves who were not to some 
degree mentally troubled. The dominant model in recent historiography comes from 
Michael MacDonald’s articles on English suicide and his subsequent book with Terence 
Murphy, which argued that a near-automatic link between voluntary death and mental 
disorder became established during the long eighteenth century (MacDonald, 1977; 
1986; MacDonald, Murphy, 1990). This line came out of a focus on English coroners’ 
inquest verdicts, which began increasingly after the Restoration to find suicides non 
compos mentis (insane and thus blameless) rather than felo de se (culpable criminals). 
MacDonald and Murphy argue that, by the mid-eighteenth century, inquests found 
most suicides lunatic, a ‘selectively medical’ understanding that eventually became 
broadly accepted by lay and professional observers alike. Generalised and sometimes 
passionate religious opposition to suicide was also softened into toleration by a 
secularizing, civilizing or Enlightening process. As an all-encompassing and apparently 
well-substantiated interpretation, this modernisation narrative has reached the status 
of orthodoxy. Among others, Jeffrey Watt introduced his edited volume on European 
suicide by rehearsing that it became ‘decriminalized, secularized, and medicalized’ 
during the early modern period (Watt, 2004: 8; Healey, 2006). Some of the contributions 
to Watt’s volume show this picture to be over-simplified and indeed there is a nagging 
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sense of dissatisfaction with it shown in some more recent literature (Wright, Weaver, 
2008; Siena, 2008: 59-60, 63-4). 
This article argues that the medical link between insanity and suicide was a 
selective and contingent one, embedded in religious, social, and moral assumptions, 
that vitiates simple models of change. In understanding how insanity and its 
implications for death were negotiated in practice, the most helpful recent development 
has been Akihito Suzuki’s encapsulation of what we know of relations between families 
and medical practitioners in the phrase ‘domestic psychiatry’ (Suzuki, 2006: 63-4; 
Houston, 2003b). Deep into the nineteenth century English psychiatric practitioners 
were caught between their working environment and their training and experience: 
between ‘endorsing the old family-dependent diagnostic pattern and … insisting that 
the diagnosis was a scientific one’ (Suzuki, 2006: 69, 183).  
Rather than seeking to offer an aetiological or epidemiological survey of 
madness and suicide, this article assesses medical, legal, familial and media commentary 
on the relationship between suicide and madness in Britain. It examines first how 
relationships between mental afflictions and death by suicide were understood and 
communicated by British doctors to families and coroners’ inquests and how medical 
publications mediated the connection. Medical professionals explicated and 
contextualised the deaths of their clients or subjects, delineated the relationship 
between madness and death, and advised and counselled families on the deaths of their 
mentally ill members. Some insights are given into the emotionally charged yet complex 
ways those close to attempted or successful suicides related to their situation. The 
second section sets out how the law treated insanity and responsibility in instances of 
attempted or completed suicide outside the coroner’s inquest. It emphasises the 
rigorous procedures in all sorts of tribunals, under both Scottish and English law, 
compared with the inchoate standards applied by English inquests. The third section 
explores how suicidal deaths were portrayed in newspapers and pamphlets, for they 
were an important interface between medical and legal interpretations of suicide and 
madness on the one hand and broader societal constructions on the other. The 
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geographical focus is on Scotland and the north of England: what might be called 
northern Britain. 
Dealing with understandings of the relationship between madness and suicide, 
the article uses coroners’ inquest findings, printed media, and family correspondence as 
well as medical and legal writings to explore perceptions of the links between state of 
mind and suicide. Concentrating on coroners’ inquests alone can distort the way we see 
the connection because they present only one view: their beguiling insights into a lost 
mental world belie sometimes intractable problems of interpretation. The argument is 
that there was no medicalization of suicide in the sense that lay or professional 
observers came to see it normally as the result of madness; properly medical 
understandings were as discriminating as were legal ones (Houston, 2008). Media 
constructions that appear to offer a generalised exculpatory association between 
madness and suicide were in reality complex moral judgements about social worth. The 
article touches on asylums, but its main focus is on deaths in domestic locations. 
Asylums are a problematic place to start looking at madness and suicide because: only 
something like a fifth or a sixth of admissions to late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century British asylums had a history of suicidal attempts or inclinations; concerns with 
cure and public image meant close supervisory regimes and therefore very few suicides 
among the institutionalised (Digby, 1985: 198; Shepherd, Wright, 2002: 191-3; Michael, 
2003b: 52-7; York, 2009).1 Thus the article is one sign of how, in Melling and Forsythe’s 
words, ‘historians of the asylum have moved the area of debate from the discourse of 
psychiatrists and their institutional practices to the wider social and demographic 
environment in which the asylum flourished’ (Melling, Forsyth, 2006: 97). 
 
Medicine, madness and suicide 
In the century after the Restoration English coroners’ inquests came increasingly 
to find those who killed themselves non compos mentis; the normal verdict in earlier 
centuries had been felo de se, meaning that corporal and patrimonial penalties might be 
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visited on those guilty of self-murder (Houston, 2010). The latter verdict assigned 
responsibility, the former absolved – and did so in terms that look psychological. This 
change might be seen as initiating a routine link between madness and suicide. Juries 
adopted the fiction of near-universal lunacy to protect the reputation and property of 
the dead and doctors were obliged to change their line as a result. Of inquest findings 
on suicide, Jeremy Bentham wrote: ‘perjury is the penance that, at the expense of 
religion, prevents an outrage on humanity’ (1838, vol. 1: 480). In fact contemporaries 
recognised the verdict for the oddity it was, flying in the face of most accepted canons 
of proof. For their part medical men who argued that the verdict of felo de se was 
unjustifiable ‘owing to insanity being present in every instance’ used the opinion 
strategically to comment on more than suicide or tactically (and obliquely and 
selectively) to tell their clients what they wanted to hear (Winslow, 1840: 337).  
The last quotation comes from Forbes Winslow, writing in 1840 because, as he 
states in his book’s preface, a paper he gave to the Westminster Medical Society 
provoked ‘animated discussion’ (Winslow, 1840: v). The reason for this is that most 
doctors flatly disagreed with Winslow, whose main driving force was a mix of religious 
fervour and social awareness, over his contentious – some thought ridiculous - medical 
ideas (Anderson, 1987: 275n). This carried on a tradition that had its roots in religious 
dissent rather than in the sort of Toryism Winslow touted. Earlier examples included Sir 
Richard Blackmore’s staunch refutation of the alleged connection between 
‘enthusiastic’ religion and madness in the early part of the eighteenth century and the 
late-eighteenth-century attempt by Thomas Percival to develop ideas of ‘temporary 
distraction’ in cases of suicide (Haakonssen, 1997: 162-3). Indeed, from Elizabethan 
Timothy Bright and Jacobean Robert Burton onwards, it was ‘the warmer sort of 
Protestants’ who were most active in singling out a role for medical interpretations of 
the link between suicide and madness as they sought to isolate legitimate 
demonstrations of religious faith from manifestations of mental dysfunction (Anon., 
1750: 61-4). Here religion stood alongside a medical interpretation and put that 
understanding in its service rather than being replaced by it. 
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Other nineteenth-century physicians who ventured to suggest a more general 
connection usually had a specific agenda. J. G. Davey M.D. argued in August 1870 ‘that 
the act of suicide is at all times and under every kind and variety of circumstance the 
effect of a pre-existing cerebro-mental disease’. Thus, he trumpeted, ‘I claim for the 
“self-murderer” his abolition or freedom from all and every responsibility; and, as a 
sequence, the non-liability of his heirs or representatives to suffer either in person or in 
purse in any way whatsoever’. Davey was primarily exercised by the attitude of life 
insurance companies, but he was tilting at windmills (Davey, 1870-1: 410).2 ‘Insanity’ 
was only a recognised cause of death in three out of 975 deaths resulting in claims to 
the Scottish Widow’s Fund in the years 1853-9 and three from 1,398 deaths 1860-66; 
there had been none at all 1846-52. ‘Suicide’, a recognised cause of death and by this 
date generally an acceptable one for payment to be made, comprised six, thirteen and 
six in the respective periods (Begbie, 1867-8: 969-70, 980; Winslow, 1840: 132-3). 
Medical practitioners seldom followed this line and were more likely to look for a 
connection with physical pathology rather than psychogenic anomalies when explaining 
suicide. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century medical and other observers 
tried their best to link the acceptable lunacy of suicide to physical ailments rather than 
allowing the taint associated with mental illnesses, acting as employees who legitimised 
conventional lay understandings rather than introducing new professional ones. One 
way was to focus on a physical ailment like a fever or inflammation that had 
psychotropic effects, an important emphasis on the pyretic, where insanity was 
commonly viewed as a-pyretic by contemporary practitioners. When Miss Allan’s 
brother took an overdose of laudanum in May 1824, a Durham doctor opined that, 
during a drinking bout the night before, bad wine had ‘caused a stupor or inflammation 
of the brain’ and thus created a temporary insanity (Durham University Archives, 
Wharton 754). This diagnosis, which had the authority of tradition in resembling part of 
Robert Burton’s early-seventeenth-century analysis of the physiology of melancholy, 
provided a medical gloss that served the needs of the family (Gowland, 2006: 81).  
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The reasons why medical men offered these sorts of explanations are not far to 
seek. Serious issues could arise from accepting that a person had died in a state of 
insanity, ranging from the validity of any contracts or will they might have made to the 
more generalized stigma of madness and the effects it could have on the reputation and 
even marriageability of other members of a family not directly tainted by the label 
(Bonfield, 1997; Houston, 2003a). As Boulton and Black show, of the reporting of lunacy 
as a cause of death by lay searchers in seventeenth and eighteenth century London, any 
link between insanity and self-murder was often suppressed except for the poor or 
poorly connected. Similarly, friendless paupers had, since at least the sixteenth century, 
been the most likely group to end up as anatomical subjects for British dissections 
(Houston, 2010: 248-50). The better-off were a very different proposition and the 
Durham doctor would have sympathised with George Cheyne, who observed a century 
before that ‘nervous distempers especially, are under some kind of disgrace and 
imputation, in the opinion of the vulgar and unlearned; they pass among the multitude, 
for a lower degree of lunacy, and the first step towards a distemper’d brain: and the 
best construction is whim, ill-humour, peevishness or particularity; and in the sex, 
daintiness, fantasticalness or coquetry’ (Cheyne, 1733: 260).  
A similar exculpatory narrative was constructed around a northern clergyman. In 
November 1834 Rev. Henry Ridley shot himself in the mouth while out hunting with his 
friend Dr Hey (possibly of the York Retreat). In letters to Sir Matthew Ridley about the 
suicide, Hey wrote of ‘mental depression’. The vicar’s wife had persuaded her husband 
to see Hey, but Ridley told Hey ‘he was satisfied that I could be of no benefit to him as 
his malady was on the mind. In fact, said he, my heart is broke and I feel that nothing 
can be of any avail.’ Hinting at some sexual disease or dysfunction, Hey recounted one 
possible, if trivial, reason for the depression: Ridley told him ‘what the cause of it was, 
binding me to the strictest secrecy especially from Mrs and Miss Ridley. It turned out to 
be so ridiculous that I endeavoured by every possible argument to show it to him in that 
light tho’ without success’. Ridley became agitated then ‘very low, saying that even his 
household now despised him; that he was an outcast from society’. For all the 
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psychological help he tried to give Ridley, Hey concluded by attributing the onset of the 
depression to ‘a bilious attack before which time his mind had not been affected’. Hey 
sought to balance the possible, the secret, the trivial and the physical as counterweights 
to any assumption of psychogenic madness (Northumberland Record Office, ZRI/30/14). 
Like other medical men torn between a need to be diplomatic and a concern to be 
accurate, Hey focused on somatic illness as a reason for suicide. Meanwhile the women 
in the family blamed a servant who allowed Ridley to leave his sight, a choice of 
scapegoat based on emotion and perhaps social prejudice that ignored years of 
melancholy and earlier examples of Ridley’s single-minded determination to die. 
The distinctively medical contribution to Georgian coroners’ inquests was 
opening the body, not unravelling the mind. The medical men called to Cockermouth in 
September 1802 to sew up the self-inflicted cut in Peter Richardson’s throat made no 
comment on his mental state, leaving it up to a servant girl to explain to the inquest 
after he died that her master showed no ‘want of understanding’ when sober even if he 
could be ‘harty and pasionate’ in drink, suggesting only that he was ‘broken hearted … 
afraid he would come to want’ and adding that he regretted what he had done and 
asked her to pray with him – a sign of reason, remorse and repentance (Cumbria Record 
Office Whitehaven, D/LEC/CRI/111/9). This was lay rather than professional 
psychologising. A century earlier the physician called to attend to John Atkinson after he 
had cut his throat threw only incidental light on his state of mind when he mentioned 
how the dying man had admitted going to a well in Wigton (Cumb.), but ‘dreadinge 
some might see him’ returned home to cut his throat in private: again an action 
requiring the use of reason (Cumbria Record Office Whitehaven, D/LEC/CRI/5/3). 
Atkinson might have been morally insane, but his reason had not left him. 
The only time a Cumbrian surgeon did pronounce at any length on mental state 
to an inquest was in the case of octogenarian John Braithwaite a few days before his 
death late in 1803. John Jackson of Egremont visited him before his death and found 
him ‘complaining of an uneasiness and confusion in his head and giddiness and want of 
recollection’, which he diagnosed as ‘an affection of the brain’. He found the old man ‘in 
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a very desponding way wholly from want of his mental faculties … deranged and 
deprived of his true reason and understanding and rendered incapable of forming a true 
judgement of what he did’ (Cumbria Record Office Whitehaven, D/LEC/CRI/112/13). 
Practitioners summoned by English coroners ‘were selected not for their special skill in 
reading dead bodies as generic texts, but for their supposed capacity to provide 
evidence in relation to the specific circumstances of a specific death’ (Burney, 1999: 
109; Rudolf, 2008). Medical men rarely appeared as witnesses before northern English 
coroners’ inquests and, when they did, talked about physiological aspects of wounds 
and ingestions rather than psychological dimensions of their patients. Inquests sat on 
the view of a body and the evidence that interested them was principally what lay 
before them; witnesses of any kind simply helped the jury to see more clearly. 
 
Law, madness and suicide 
A judicious approach to the apparent connection between suicide and insanity 
among doctors paralleled a discriminating judicial treatment by lawyers. In every court 
except a coroner’s the standards of proof of mental disability were as stringent as they 
were clear. Scots law was particularly rigorous about evidence and one of two famous 
cases from the early nineteenth century was appealed to Scotland’s supreme court and 
then to the House of Lords, which confirmed the Court of Session’s judgement in May 
1813, allowing the case to enter the ‘English Reports’ as British case law (M’Adam [sic] v 
Walker, 1 Dow P. C. 148). Explaining the law to medical students, Professor Robert 
Christison summarised the more famous case in his Edinburgh university lectures on 
medical jurisprudence c.1830: ‘A person in the better sphere of life, in order to 
legitimise his children by a woman of low rank, is legally married to her; but, resolving 
never to confront his old companions after his depradation, commits suicide 
immediately after the marriage has been celebrated’ (Edinburgh University Library 
Special Collections, Dk4.57, ‘Of Disqualifications’, 8 [insert]). Those who sought to prove 
Quintin Macadam of Craigengillan insane summarised what they took to be signs of his 
mental state, as perceived by those with whom he had day to day intercourse. 
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‘Occasionally he had very low spirits and repining gloomy fits. At other times he was 
very elevated. When the disease was on him he was violent and outrageous to the last 
degree. … he often spoke of destroying himself … His eye had a particular appearance 
which is only remarked in people who are insane. His mind was filled with jealousies and 
suspicions, which is one of the most common and decisive symptoms of insanity. He was 
subject to vain and groundless imaginations, & believed that he was despised by every 
body.’ He did not like being looked at (National Archives of Scotland, CC8/5/29/1, 
Walker v Macadam: 280).  
In the other (earlier) case, Callman v Gourlay, counsel pleaded that, though their 
client’s brother had hanged himself, this was only a temporary fit rather than a sign of 
chronic insanity. 
Altho the coroner’s jury in England are in the practice of adopting a very useful 
fiction of law, and uniformly imputing suicide to insanity, and altho such 
depression of spirits as produces suicide may be construed into a momentary 
insanity, yet … [it is not] that permanent insanity or imbecility which ought to 
hinder a man from having management of his own affairs … Altho when 
depression of spirits arrives at the height of suicide, it may perhaps be 
construed into insanity, yet the respondents do not understand that this 
depression in its progress, unless it rendered a man completely unfit to manage 
his affairs, was ever held sufficient to convict a man of lunacy (National 
Archives of Scotland, CC8/5/22, Callman v Gourlay [np]). 
Not all types of mental problems removed intention and therefore responsibility, and 
contemporaries perceived gradations of symptoms, and therefore effects on the 
exercise of will, even within syndromes. By 1830 Christison could generalise further. 
‘There is hardly any single extravagant act or expression, that will prove a man to be 
insane: it can only be proved by comparing together many similar acts or expressions’ 
(Edinburgh University Library Special Collections, Dk.4.57, ‘Of Disqualifications’: 19). 
Failures of judgement ‘must be manifested in several actions, if not habitually’ 
(Edinburgh University Library Special Collections, Dk.4.57, ‘Of Disqualifications’: 6). Of 
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itself, a single act such as committing suicide was not proof of mental derangement. As 
will become clear later in the article, insanity defences too required a prominent and 
more-or-less consistent suite of words and deeds to be successful.  
The advocate (like an English barrister) in Callman v Gourlay was plainly relieved 
that Scotland did not have ‘crowner law’, though he also recognised the inconvenience 
to his arguments caused by having its operation as a backdrop to his case. Scots law was 
very different from English, but both in their writings and in court, English lawyers were 
as likely to oppose the link between suicide and insanity that was becoming routine for 
coroners’ inquests, even when they too were forced to recognise its currency. Early-
eighteenth-century English legal writer, William Nelson, summarised the practical 
implications in a non-committal way. 
It has been the Opinion of Learned Men, That a Person who is Compos Mentis 
cannot be guilty of so much Malice towards his Person, which may occasion 
him wilfully to kill himself; because naturally the Intentions of Men aim at what 
is good for themselves, and at what conduceth to their own Preservation: and 
therefore ‘tis to be presumed, that where a Man killeth himself, he is not 
Compos Mentis (Nelson, 1710: 258). 
This guarded exposition conceals a deep-seated reservation about what inquests were 
starting to do when Nelson wrote, bringing in verdicts which treated suicide as 
conclusive evidence of mental unsoundness. By doing so, writers like Nelson argued, the 
juries were hardly being candid, but were instead simply evading the artificial doctrine 
of constructive murder because of the material and religious loss that a suicide incurred. 
In The pleas of the crown Nelson’s contemporary and sergeant-at-law, William Hawkins, 
took notice of 
a strange Notion, which has unaccountably prevailed of late, That every one 
who kills himself must be Non compos of Course; for it is said to be impossible, 
That a man in his Senses should do a Thing so contrary to Nature and all Sense 
and Reason. … May it not with as much Reason be argued, That the Murder of a 
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Child or of a Parent is against Nature and Reason, and consequently that no 
Man in his Senses can commit it? (Hawkins, 1716: 67; Moore, 1790, vol. 1: 322-
41). 
In the 1760s the famous legal writer and judge, William Blackstone, rehearsed earlier 
arguments almost verbatim, concluding: ‘The law very rationally judges, that every 
melancholy or hypochondriac fit does not deprive a man of the capacity of discerning 
right from wrong; which is necessary … to form a legal excuse. And therefore, if a real 
lunatic kills himself in a lucid interval, he is a felo de se as much as another man’ 
(Blackstone, 1769: 189-90). Half a century on, English lawyers were still universal in their 
condemnation of such an assumption. In a section dealing with suicide, which is as short 
as those of most legal texts, G. D. Collinson acknowledged in 1812: ‘As a non compos 
cannot commit murder, so neither can he be felo de se’ (Collinson, 1812: 494). He 
continued, explaining in a footnote that juries confused ‘strong passions’ with insaity: 
c. 26. The notion is prevalent, that whoever commits suicide is under the 
influence of insanity; it being supposed impossible for a person in his senses to 
do an act so repugnant to reason and nature. 
c. 27. This, however, is bad law. 
c. 28. And wretched philosophy. 
Georgian clerics assimilated these arguments into their discourses on social and 
moral matters. Writing as a High Anglican clergyman and academic, Charles Moore 
warned in 1790 of the indiscriminate association between madness and suicide: ‘But 
some, who are ever desirous of leaning towards the side of humanity, are inclined to 
judge, that every act of suicide (being so horrid and unnatural) implies a subversion of 
the brain, or a species of madness’ (Moore, 1790: 4) Such arguments were frequently 
rehearsed, not only by the clergy (the villains of MacDonald and Murphy’s account) but 
by most learned people. When the Earl of Egremont, lord of the honour of Cockermouth 
and Egremont, condemned ‘verdicts of lunacy when suicide is a rational decision’, he 
spoke as an educated man as much as he did a financially interested franchisee with the 
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right to the forfeited goods of culpable suicides (East Sussex Record Office, SAS/A748). 
Indeed, writers from every background continued throughout the long eighteenth 
century to question the association made by coroners’ juries (Andrew, 1988). They 
argued for a discriminating approach to the connection between insanity and suicide – 
as is indeed evident in every domain other than post-Restoration coroners’ inquests.  
Scots (and some English) observers who wrote about English coroners’ juries 
suggested that they could offer verdicts of non compos mentis because to do so made 
no difference to anything except the dead person’s reputation – vital as this was to 
economic and social life. This made it simple for them to exalt ‘compassion over truth 
and justice’ and offer a verdict, ‘which excluding all offence effectually screens from all 
reproach’ (Moore, 1790: 324). Coroners’ inquests were the odd man out when it came 
to understanding the link between madness and suicide. Inquests may have felt 
sympathy for the families of suicides, yet criminal court juries comprised of the same 
kinds of middle-rank people could make discriminating decisions about insanity and 
responsibility, which had similar consequences for the reputation, emotional 
equanimity, and material circumstances of the accused person’s family – not to mention 
his own peace of mind and chances of life. In other contexts English (and Scottish) 
courts showed an ability to decide on someone’s mental fitness for trial, their 
responsibility for a crime, or their ability to manage their business affairs, based on a 
close and discriminating understanding of lunacy and its various (and variable) effects 
on voluntary action (Houston, 2000; Adamson, 2004). Even lay searchers of the dead in 
eighteenth-century London could make the distinction and Dr William Black noted: ‘The 
coroner’s inquest generally returns suicides as lunaticks, after reciting the mode of their 
death; but the searcher’s reports in the bills of mortality, have invariably ranged lunatic 
and self-murder under two distinct heads’ (Black, 1789: 128. Siena, 2010). Except in the 
coroners’ courts, decisions over personal agency could indeed follow ‘truth and justice’.  
 
Public opinion, madness and suicide 
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Historians of psychiatry tend to concentrate on how medical understandings are 
constructed among doctors: if they go beyond this it is to explore how medical 
knowledge and opinion were mediated to courts or perhaps to patients and their 
families or parishes. The first half of this article has focused on these professional 
presentations and other contexts have been covered, most notably criminal courts 
(Eigen 1995). There are, however, other fora for representations of the link between 
madness and suicide that probably had a much wider constituency. Thus, for example: 
literary scholar Barbara Gates has examined factual and fictional representations of 
suicide during the Victorian period (1988); Donna Andrew has looked at how the death 
of Sir Samuel Romilly appeared in the press (2004); MacDonald and Murphy have 
sampled southern English newspapers to assess how understandings were created in 
the new ‘public sphere’ of the eighteenth century (1990: 301-37); and an exciting new 
article by Jeremy Caradonna opens up French newspapers to scrutiny (2010). For both 
Scotland and England, newspaper reports allow understandings of madness and suicide 
to be analysed at two levels. The first is the use of terms like ‘lunatic’, ‘melancholy’ or 
‘disordered’ to describe a person’s state of mind when they attempted or succeeded in 
making away with themselves. The second is in the social selectivity of reporting. In 
short, newspapers presented an image of suicide as a matter for the dependent classes 
and of the mental state of those they reported as one of moral failure rather than 
medical pathology. Newspapers did help to medicalize understandings of suicide, but by 
stressing the need for prompt professional doctoring rather than by opening up the 
mind of self-harmers or self-murderers. 
The tone of reporting is set by a short intervention in a Whitehaven-based 
newspaper, the Cumberland Pacquet, commenting on the conventional vocabulary of 
reporting deaths in 1805 (Cumberland Pacquet, no. 1588: 19 March 1805). 
It is curious to remark a striking diversity in the modes of expression currently 
used to denote the death of different descriptions of persons. They whose 
names make up the ordinary bills of mortality, are said to have died, or paid the 
debt of nature. The capital convict is always launched into eternity. The suicide 
15 
 
as constantly puts an end to his existence. These expressions are by no means 
of equal import.  
The Pacquet’s point was that it was wrong to suggest an end with suicide because those 
who took their own lives were surely damned; much of its reporting was overtly hostile 
to suicide and contemporaries were aware of the differences between representations 
of agencies and eschatologies. The value of the story is to highlight that death has a 
context made up of precedent and antecedent interpretations, of which the fate of the 
soul is just one.  
Some reference to mental state is made in 84 of 214 reports of attempted or 
successful suicide (39%) drawn from a sample of Scottish newspapers, 1748-1826. That 
they offered any explanation of the event is at one level surprising, because such an 
attribution was not a routine part of the investigation of suspicious death in Scotland, 
which dealt with agency rather than responsibility, and because it had, to all intents and 
purposes, no legal effect after forfeiture for civil debt was abolished there in 1748. 
Saying that a person died disordered in their senses might be seen as a defence of their 
reputation, but its purpose was simply to confirm that the case was closed. Furthermore 
Scottish investigations of sudden death were conducted in private by magistrates who 
took evidence at discretion rather than in the open forum of a coroner’s inquest with its 
lay jury, making Scottish newspaper commentary a gloss rather than a report.  
 
mental state N % 
disordered/deranged 25 30 
melancholy 14 17 
depressed/despondent/discontent
ed 
14 17 
insane 13 15 
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delirious 12 14 
other 6 7 
total 84 100 
Table: vocabulary describing mental state of attempted and successful suicides in 
Scottish newspapers, 1748-18263 
 
One might hypothesise that this style of reporting subliminally changed 
perceptions of madness and suicide. However, some of the longer reports make it plain 
that suffering from mental problems did not exonerate the dead. The Aberdeen Journal 
reported in 1761 the case of an Aberdeenshire woman, who, ‘for some time disordered 
in her senses’, had tried to hang herself. The account added that neighbours had 
prevented ‘her wicked purpose’. ‘Yet so strong is her distemper of mind, that instead of 
being thankful for her preservation, she expressed great dissatisfaction on recovering 
from her swoon’ (no. 647: 2 June 1760). Derangement could be blameworthy. Indeed, 
the connection between mental problems and suicide in the newspapers did not always 
flow in one direction. An Aberdeen woman hanged herself from a tree, but her husband 
cut her down and saved her life. ‘She is, however, disordered in her sense [sic] ever 
since’ (Aberdeen Journal, no. 1162: 16 April 1770). For others the attempt was said to 
have helped a state of mind, carrying on the emphasis in Calvinist conversion narratives 
about the redemptive power of contemplating death. A Montrose woman threw herself 
out of a high window ‘in a fit of delirium’, but ‘far from being injured by the fall, it is said 
that her mental health has been in some measure restored’ (Aberdeen Journal, no. 
4052: 7 September 1825).  
The phrase ‘fit of delirium’ can be described as a medical judgement, but 
medicine did not own other terms like ‘discontent’ or ‘melancholy’: the latter word 
could also mean sad or lamentable and could be applied to condemn the suicide itself 
rather than the state of mind causing it. An account from Forfarshire turned an 
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apparently neutral or even sympathetic term like ‘melancholy’ into a moral judgement. 
It told how ‘a man upwards of sixty years, and in his third marriage, hanged himself. It is 
melancholy to observe the rapid progress which the detestable crime of suicide is 
making in this country’ (Aberdeen Journal, no. 1266: 14 March 1774). This case also 
exemplifies the ambivalence of much reporting: suicide was saddening, but it was also 
wrong. In April 1799 ‘a woman of Milton near Kirkintilloch put a period to her existence 
… She had been long in a deranged state, and had arisen during the night unobserved by 
her husband, and committed the desperate act’ (The Edinburgh Weekly Journal, 2(67): 
118). Desperate here was a religious term that meant ‘without hope’ rather than simply 
‘at the end of her tether’ and, even when mentioning derangement, the judgement of 
her act was elided by the mention of secrecy – which still had undertones of the ulterior 
and which the newspaper implied required thought and calculation.  
Newspaper reporting of the mental state of English suicide is more closely tied to 
the wording of coroners’ inquests, which were public and participative events into 
which men of the middling sort brought their own ideas of evidence and proof, and 
from which they took not only their findings, but also ideas acquired through 
deliberations and direction by the coroner. Some 163 out of 235 cases reported by the 
Newcastle Courant gave an attribution of mental state (69%): five were felo de se and 
the most common label was ‘lunacy’ or ‘insane’, expressed in italics at the end of the 
entry to indicate a verdict (four-fifths of cases), followed in descending order of 
frequency by ‘deranged’, ‘disordered’ and ‘melancholy’. For the Cumberland Pacquet 
the statistics are 147 of 236 (62%), of which 18 are felo de se. In the remainder, lunacy 
or insanity predominate as in the Courant. English newspapers seldom provide any 
more information than what they could derive from inquest verdicts. Prior to the 1790s 
any description of mental state was unusual and it is worth noting that only then did 
newspapers start giving verdicts routinely – long after coroners’ inquests had come to 
offer ‘non compos mentis’ as their usual verdict on suicides.  
When they mentioned medical intervention, newspapers in both countries 
confirmed that the role of surgeons and physicians was to pronounce on the physical 
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appearance of the corpse and the proximate cause of death, rather than the ultimate 
mental state that brought it about. For example, the Cumberland Pacquet reported how 
Mr Theophilus Smith, confined in Stafford gaol for shooting a Mr Wainright of Liverpool, 
tried to do the same to his wife while she was visiting and then shot himself in the head: 
‘the ball entered a little above the left ear, passed through his head, came out on the 
opposite side, and caused his immediate death’ (no. 1370: 13 January 1801). Nothing 
explicit was said of Smith’s mind. English newspapers proffered a positive model of 
medical intervention that sought explicitly to change attitudes that might be antithetical 
to effective intercession. Referring to the suicide by hanging of an apprentice in 1738, 
the Newcastle Courant was at pains to correct ‘an ignorant opinion that prevails with 
some people, that no one must meddle with a person in such circumstances’ (no. 680: 6 
May 1738). A generation later it told of a servant maid found hanging in a cellar at 
Painterheugh. Two hours after ‘this unhappy wretch’ was cut down, a considerable 
amount of warmth remained in her clothes and unsuccessful efforts were made to 
revive her, but (the paper announced) ‘if proper assistance had been given on the 
immediate discovery of the body’ she might have recovered (no. 5281: 13 December 
1777).  
Newspapers created expectations of physical treatment for those who might be 
saved from their own self-harm. When it came to mental state their reporting described 
people whose spiritual salvation was doubtful, whose minds were clear and rational, 
and whose purpose was wrongful. Reporting that focused on a link between madness 
and suicide was socially selective and the implication was that only a certain class of 
self-murderer was mad. Yet here again ‘lunacy’ was not exculpatory, but accusatory. 
The better sort who killed themselves were either not reported at all or their death was 
‘laundered’ by placing them among the naturally or accidentally dead in the column of 
local deaths rather than local news. The protection of rank was extended to sensational 
instances of self-harm short of suicide. A postscript to a letter of 21 June 1753 from 
Thomas Cockburn at Edinburgh to Sir John Hall of Dunglass describes an horrific event in 
Northumberland: Lord Charles Gordon ‘cut up his yard [penis] and then cutt off an inch 
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or two, by which he was in hazard of bleeding to death. His wounds were dressed up but 
his life despaired of. He has been in a rambling mad condition these several weeks’ 
(National Archives of Scotland, GD206/2/261/9). Newspaper reports were anonymised 
and sanitised of the detailed fact, the intent and the madness. The Edinburgh Evening 
Courant offered the following account. ‘Last week a person of high distinction stabbed 
himself at Wooler in Northumberland in a very cruel manner; but we hear, by being 
discovered, and proper assistance, his life is in no great danger’ (Edinburgh Evening 
Courant, no. 5842: 26 June 1753). In contrast, the Newcastle Courant, read by the 
gentry and bourgeoisie of the north-east, did not report this case. 
At the other end of the spectrum of status and respectability, insanity might be 
rejected for quite different reasons. For accused or convicted criminals, desire for death 
or even an attempt to die were not necessary signs of an underlying insanity that 
precluded responsibility. Like flight they were, instead, more commonly taken as 
indicators of guilt. A newspaper report from 1725 was explicit. ‘Yesterday was execute 
in the Grass-market [of Edinburgh] Archibald Waker, weaver in Luss [Dumbartonshire], 
for the Murther of Walter M’Farline, who, to the last Moment, denied his being guilty of 
the Murder; but his Behaviour in Jayl, and his attempting to dispatch himself the 
Morning before his Execution, makes his Speech by far the less credible’ (Edinburgh 
Evening Courant, no. 981: 18 March 1725). Broadsides that reported criminal trials 
affirmed the same message about the lack of connection between suicide and madness. 
When John Stewart was on trial for his life at Perth in 1833 for the murder of his wife, a 
number of witnesses gave evidence to prove that he ‘had formerly attempted to 
commit suicide,— that he was subject to epiliptic [sic] fits,— and that he was insane’. 
However, others said the exact opposite, including Dr Ma’colm, physician in Perth and 
also physician to Murray’s Royal Asylum there, who ‘thought him perfectly sane when 
he first saw him, anid [sic] is of the same opinion still; does not hold an attempt to 
commit suicide an infallible proof of insanity’ (Anon., 1833). This was the opinion that 
prevailed and Stewart was sentenced to death. 
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English media treated attempted or successful suicide of criminals in the same 
way as Scots. Eugene Aram, a Knaresborough schoolmaster, was condemned to hang at 
York on 6 August 1759 for a murder committed in 1745. The night before he was due to 
be executed he slashed his arms and was nearly dead from loss of blood when found in 
the morning. ‘By proper applications he was brought to himself and, though weak’, was 
taken to his execution on schedule and subsequently gibbeted (Anon., 1759: 23). A 
pamphlet published to cash in on the execution reproduced a suicide note allegedly left 
in his cell.  
To die is natural and necessary … I fear no more to die than to be born. But the 
manner of it … should be decent and manly … Certainly no body has a better 
right to dispose of a man’s life than himself … As to any indignities offered to 
my body, or silly reflections on my faith and morals, they are, as they always 
were, things indifferent to me. I think, though contrary to the common way of 
thinking, I wrong no man by this, and hope it is not offensive to that Eternal 
Being that formed me and the world … (23-4). 
Inviting its readers to deplore Aram’s impiety, the pamphlet just as coolly closed by 
distancing itself from his deism. ‘Notwithstanding he pleads a sovereign right over 
himself, in vindication of this last horrid crime, and appears, at first view, actuated by 
honour and courage, yet a little reflection will convince any one, his motive for such an 
inhuman deed was nothing more than the fear of shame’ (24). 
 
Conclusion 
Printed media sensationalised, censured, and even satirised suicide. They not only 
registered and disseminated an interpretation, but also shaped understandings through 
use of language and selective reporting (Zelnik, 1988: 57; Snell, 2005). Newspapers 
created the impression that suicide came not out of mental pathology, but from a 
reasoned if wrong choice about how to deal with normal extremes of emotion and 
circumstance. Any pathology was social and moral rather than medical for suicide was at 
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root a failure of character. Reports of criminal suicides chilled readers by explicating the 
rationality of attempts to prevent the shame of execution. The injured or dying were 
represented as essentially sane in seeking to excuse their actions or to repent them, the 
former a rationalisation, the latter an equally self-possessed act of repentance and 
reconciliation. Medical men forced to offer an opinion dwelt on the somatic rather than 
the psychogenic side of ‘lunacy’ and they emphasized how specific was the link between 
madness and suicide (Brugis, 1652: 191-206). Rather than accepting the apparently 
medical verdict of ‘lunacy’, most professionals knew that coroners inquests were very 
different from any other tribunal or legal context because: their main constraints were 
procedural and they were not bound by the same rules of evidence as other courts; they 
were meant to be participative, which rendered them amenable to influence by family 
and community. Lawyers, used to substantive common, civil, ecclesiastical, or canon law 
rather than ‘crowner law’, stood aghast at their findings. For their part families who 
would have been happy with an inquest verdict of non compos mentis were unwilling to 
accept a diagnosis of psychogenic insanity from a doctor, knowing that the two were 
wholly different things. 
It is wrong to state for England that at ‘some point during the mid-eighteenth 
century the men of middling rank who served as coroners’ jurors adopted the medical 
interpretation of suicide’ (MacDonald, Murphy, 1990: 114). Indeed, as MacDonald and 
Murphy themselves point out, medical men almost never supported juries’ automatic 
link between suicide and insanity and nor did any other court. Finding someone non 
compos mentis on the basis of the act of suicide alone was no more a respectable 
medical judgement than it was a tenable legal one, for doctors were selective rather 
than indiscriminate in their association of madness with suicide and few saw any 
necessary association between suicide and mental ill-health. Lay and professional alike 
recognised that suicide might be preceded by some form of perturbation of mind arising 
from transitory unhappiness or suffering that was not necessarily associated with full-
blown psychogenic illness. Physicians or surgeons more usually treated madness and 
suicide as sometimes associated, sometimes separate. Most refused to see any 
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necessary link between the wide spectrum of disorders called ‘lunacy’ or ‘insanity’ and a 
propensity to end life, except in the rather specific case of melancholics. Robert 
Christison knew that the melancholic were more at risk than the manic, carrying on 
centuries of observation in refusing systematically to link all forms of madness with 
suicide (Edinburgh University Library Special Collections, Dk4.57, ‘Death from external 
injuries V: How to distinguish those produced by accident, by the individual himself, or 
by another’: ff. 18v, 20-1; ‘Asphyxia III: death by hanging’: ff. 49v, 51). Even within this 
sub-set, doctors knew that not all of those suffering from depressive disorders 
attempted or committed suicide. When mediating the connection for bereaved relatives 
doctors had to tread a fine line between what their training told them was credible and 
what their employers would stomach. Physicians and surgeons in both Scotland and 
England may sometimes have felt pressured into authenticating a construction placed 
on death by family and community. In doing so they acted as agents of ‘domestic 
psychiatry’ rather than the independent purveyors of medical thought, incorporating 
rather than replacing lay information in the rendition of medical evidence.  
If not during the long eighteenth century, when did a generalised association 
between madness and suicide become established? Martin Weiner has proposed that 
‘from the turn of the 1880s, medical opinion coalesced around a picture of the suicide 
as a product of mental defect, inherited or acquired’ (Weiner, 1990: 266). For Olive 
Anderson a climate of opinion was ‘created by the reasoned belief of so many mid-
Victorian medical men that those who took their own lives were almost invariably 
suffering from mental disease’ (1987: 268). Yet in 1884 a contributor to the Lancet 
concluded that for most suicides ‘it is not their psychical, but their moral condition 
which is at fault’ (In: Jalland, 1996: 71; Anderson, 1987: 242). Even in the 1890s the 
doctor and barrister Samuel Strahan could conclude his discussion of the link between 
suicide and insanity by asserting that ‘it is tolerably certain that only a small minority of 
our annual total of suicides arise from madness; that is, from either the absence or the 
disorder of the mental faculties’ (1893: 113). An answer to this question must accept 
enduring medical, legal and lay attitudes which discriminated between the reasons for 
23 
 
self-harm and which accepted that suicide could come not from psychogenic or even 
somatic illness, but from a wrongful personal choice. 
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1
 As Hilary Marland shows in her article, some classes of 
madness such as insanity of lactation, insanity of 
pregnancy and, to a lesser extent, puerperal insanity were 
more closely associated with propensity to suicide in 
nineteenth-century asylums. See also Loudon, 1988.  
2
 Criminal forfeiture (including that of felones de se) was 
abolished in England in 1870. 
3
 Table based on material presented in Houston, 2010: 325-
61. The category ‘melancholy’ includes instances of 
‘religious melancholy’, all from 1808-10. 
